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Tyrannophobia
Eric A. Posner* and Adrian Vermeule**
Abstract. Tyrannophobia—the fear of dictatorship—is a dominant theme in American
political discourse. Yet dictatorship has never existed in the United States or even been
likely. The hypothesis that tyrannophobia itself has prevented dictatorship from occurring
is implausible; better evidence exists for alternative hypotheses. We conclude that
tyrannophobia is an irrational political attitude that has interfered with, and continues to
interfere with, needed institutional reform.

Tyranny looms large in the American political imagination. For the framers of the
Constitution, Caesar, Cromwell, James II and George III were anti-models; for the
current generation, Hitler takes pride of place, followed by Stalin, Mao and a horde of
tyrants both historical and literary. Students read “1984” and “Animal Farm” and relax by
watching Chancellor Palpatine seize imperial power. Unsurprisingly, comparisons
between sitting presidents and the tyrants of history and fiction are a trope of political
discourse. Liberals and libertarians routinely compared George W. Bush to Hitler,
George III and Caesar. Today, Barack Obama receives the same treatment, albeit in less
respectable media of opinion. All major presidents are called a “dictator” or said to have
“dictatorial powers” from time to time.1
Yet the United States has never had a true dictator, or even come close to having
one, and rational actors should update their risk estimates in the light of experience,
reducing them if the risk repeatedly fails to materialize. By now, 233 years after
independence, these risk estimates should be close to zero. Why then does the fear of
dictatorship – tyrannophobia – persist so strongly in American political culture? Is the
fear justified, or irrational? Does tyrannophobia itself affect the risk of dictatorship? If so,
does it reduce the risk or increase it?
The plan of the essay is as follows. Section I offers some definitions and
conceptual distinctions, principally to identify the varieties of tyrannophobia that we will
*
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consider. Section II examines fears of dictatorship in American history. Section III
examines comparative evidence on the causes of dictatorship, and introduces new
evidence on the relationship across countries between dictatorship and tyrannophobia.
We find that tyrannophobia does little or nothing to prevent dictatorship.
Armed with this evidence, Section IV evaluates the relationship between
tyrannophobia and dictatorship in American history. As to the original constitutional
design, we suggest that the framers’ choice of an independently elected executive may
have created a risk of dictatorship, but that demographic factors, notably the wealth of its
population, now ensure that the United States is highly unlikely to lapse into dictatorship.
The very economic and political conditions that have created powerful executive
government, in the modern administrative state, have also strengthened informal political
checks on presidential action. The result is a president who enjoys sweeping de jure
authority, but who is constrained de facto by the reaction of a highly educated and
politically involved elite, and by mass opinion. We are skeptical that tyrannophobia itself
accounts for the absence of dictatorship in the United States, and suggest that it is a
historical relic that interferes with beneficial institutional change. A brief conclusion
follows.
I. Concepts and Distinctions
Tyrannophobia is the fear of dictatorship, but what is dictatorship? The term is
slippery in a family-resemblance sort of way, with many competing definitions and a
great deal of vague usage. One recent treatment distinguishes “tinpot” dictators, who
maximize personal consumption, from “totalitarian” dictators, who maximize power.2 In
general usage, “dictatorship” takes many forms. In one version, dictatorship is the
endpoint of a continuum that runs from fully autocratic rule by one person alone, through
oligarchy, to democracy. In this version, talk of democratic dictatorship, or perhaps even
constitutional dictatorship, would be oxymoronic. In another version, dictatorship refers
to the nature of the policies that government institutes; a “democratic” or populist
government that violated civil liberties and arbitrarily confiscated property could
coherently be called dictatorial. A third theme, especially pronounced in Anglo-American
discourse, focuses on the executive and equates dictatorship with unchecked executive
power, in which case legislative dictatorship would be the oxymoron.
Rather than attempting to identify a natural kind of dictatorship, which probably
does not exist anyway, we will combine the first and third accounts by stipulating that
dictatorship is a political system of legally unchecked rule by one person or an identified
small group of persons. Legal checks can be divided into two categories: the requirement
that the leader obtain the consent of other government officials (for example, legislators)
before acting; and the requirement that the leader submit to periodic popular elections.
Dictatorships tend to exist when both types of checks are weak or nonexistent. On this
account, dictatorship lies on a continuum and is thus a matter of degree, so usage
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implicitly varies: the fewer the checks, the more plausible the “dictator” label becomes,
but some people use the label to refer narrowly to unelected leaders, some to elected
leaders who need no consent from others, and some use “dictatorship” hyperbolically, to
refer to abuses even by an (elected) executive who is subject to some legal checks.
As intensional definitions of “dictatorship” are so slippery, extensional definition
may help indicate our interests. The paradigm cases we have in mind include absolute
monarchies (but not constitutional monarchies), fascist dictatorship based on leaderworship, military dictatorships and juntas, and most of the stock tyrannies mentioned
above. We mean to exclude various large-scale oligarchies and systems of collective rule,
such as the Chinese communist party. Dictatorship is fully consistent with the existence
of de facto political checks on the ruler; there will almost always be political forces the
dictator(s) must be careful to reward or appease, such as the military or security services,
mass public opinion, or an elite “selectorate”3 that influences the choice of dictators.
Indeed, it is common in the political economy literature on dictatorships to
assume that a dictator stays in power by satisfying the preferences of some group—a
subgroup such as the elites but potentially the entire population.4 If the dictator fails to
satisfy this group, it will overthrow him. A democratic government is assumed to satisfy
the preference of the median voter;5 if it does not, the median voter will select a different
government. Accordingly, the dictator and the democratic government may act
identically when the dictator needs the support of a majority of the entire population. The
only difference is that the democratic government is constrained by the de jure power of
the median voter, while the dictator is constrained by the de facto power of the median
citizen. Whether in fact the person with the relevant de facto power would be the median
voter under democracy depends on demographic and other variables, as we will discuss,
so a dictatorship is in principle compatible with many more political outcomes than
democracies are.
Given this definition of dictatorship, one of our major aims is to identify several
varieties of tyrannophobia, and to do this several distinctions are necessary. The
tyrannophobe may fear dictatorship in the extreme sense we have identified – the endpoint of the continuum, where the leader faces no legal checks at all, neither elections nor
the consent of others for lawmaking – or else the tyrannophobe may fear dictatorship in a
weaker sense, such as abuses by an elected executive. In general, our claims will be
stronger as the tyrannophobe’s fears are more extreme, weaker as the tyrannophobe is
more moderate; the problems have a sliding-scale quality.
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Another key distinction involves the nature of the fear that occurs in
tyrannophobia. Some fears are rationally warranted by the evidence and can be described
as justified fear. Alternatively, fear may be an emotional response that short-circuits
rational consideration of the evidence, and thus constitutes an unjustified fear.
Tyrannophobia is intrinsically ambiguous, and can refer to either variety of fear, so we
will discuss both. We should note, however, that if tyrannophobia is rational—if it refers
to a belief about the probability of dictatorship that reflects Bayesian updating—then the
label has no explanatory value. In understanding (for example) why constitutional
framers put constraints on the executive, we would refer to their justified beliefs rather
than the emotion of fear. Tyrannophobia is interesting to the extent that it reflects
irrational beliefs, in which case one wants to understand why people have these irrational
beliefs, and what effect these beliefs have on constitutions and other political outcomes.
Although we will discuss both versions of tyrannophobia, our focus will be on the
irrational version.6
Furthermore, risks are a product both of the probability that an event will
materialize – here, that a dictator will take power – and of the harms that will occur if the
risk does materialize. On the margin of probability, the unjustified variety of
tyrannophobia takes the form of exaggerated perception of the risk that a dictatorship will
occur, through the creeping expansion of executive power, through a sudden seizure of
executive power in a crisis, or through some other sequence. We consider versions of
these claims in Sections III and IV.
On the margin of harm, the question is whether the tyrannophobe rationally
considers the evidence about the costs and benefits of dictatorship. Liberal legalists
sometimes imply that dictatorship has catastrophic effects on welfare, but this is a
caricature, not supported by the evidence. It is not even clear whether authoritarian
governments systematically offer different public policies than democracies do. A
comparison of democracies and non-communist non-democracies between 1960 and
1990 finds that the two regime-types offer very similar substantive public policies; they
differ principally in terms of policies related to winning or maintaining public office, in
that nondemocracies are more likely to select leaders through violence.7 More generally,
“[a]lthough some studies have established a significant positive link between measures of
political freedom and [income] growth …, others have found that authoritarian regimes
have better growth records . . . .”8 Likewise, a recent survey finds that “there is no
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evidence that constraints on the executive predict growth[.]”9 Some of these findings can
be reconciled by the hypothesis that dictatorial regimes exhibit higher variance than
democratic regimes and a higher dispersion of growth rates;10 more generally, democracy
has both a lower downside and a lower upside.11 Whether that tradeoff is desirable
depends upon the nature of the status quo ante, the risk aversion of the population and on
the absolute level of performance under the democratic alternative.12
As compared to democracy, recent evidence does show that dictatorships apparently
provide fewer public goods,13 even controlling for variables that might conduce both to
dictatorship and to low levels of public goods, such as low income and high
heterogeneity of preferences. It is not our contention that dictatorship is superior to
democracy. Among other problems, political freedom and equality are themselves
components of welfare. Certainly, in the developed world, where democracies function
well, dictatorship has little to recommend it. The cross-country evidence we have cited
suggests more ambiguity about the developing world. It may be that a dictatorship that
keeps order and delivers a few other public goods is superior to a democracy that quickly
degenerates into anarchy. Our more modest point is just that institutional design of
democratic institutions should not assume that the loss of well-being caused by a
transition from democracy to dictatorship is higher than it in fact is.
Another distinction involves different types of safeguards against dictatorship.
Even if dictatorship is a real risk, and even if it would be harmful if it occurred, the
requisite precautions might be either institutional or else political and cultural. The
former typically arise through deliberate constitutional design, involving familiar
institutions such as legislative oversight, judicial review for statutory authorization or
constitutionality, and (in some systems) the separation of powers. Political and cultural
precautions arise, if at all, through decentralized action by many individuals. They can be
arranged on a continuum from relatively formal modes of political organization, such as
political parties capable of resisting dictatorship, to unwritten constitutional norms and
conventions,14 such as the longstanding convention that that no president should stand for
a third term (until Roosevelt did so), to a loosely defined ethos of libertarianism. We will
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examine the relationship between institutional and noninstitutional constraints in later
sections.
A last type of tyrannophobia has a temporal dimension. There is a long history of
time-limited dictatorships.15 In the ancient Roman republic, for example, the senate could
appoint a dictator to address an emergency. Some renaissance Italian republics had a
similar rule. And many modern constitutions grant executives special (although usually
not absolute) powers during emergencies. By our definition, time-limited dictatorships
are not true dictatorships because the dictator derives his authority from the people or
from elected officials. But time-limited dictatorships loom large in the imagination of the
tyrannophobe because many time-limited dictators have refused to step down.
II. Tyrannophobia in American History
A. The Founding
The Declaration of Independence is the ur-text of tyrannophobia in the United
States. Britain at the time had a constitutional monarchy and the king was by no means
the sole or even leading figure in determining colonial policy but shared power with
Parliament. Yet the Declaration focuses not on Parliament, or the British people, but on
the king, and his supposedly tyrannical methods.
The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid
world.16
A long list of the king’s outrages end in this climax:
In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most
humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated
injury. A Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a
Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.17
Parliament receives only a passing reference in the next paragraph. British policy toward
the American colonies, although very much a joint product of king and Parliament, is
personified in the king, a tyrant.
Why did Jefferson employ this rhetorical strategy? Parliament, whatever its
defects, was a quasi-representative body. If Parliament is to be blamed for the injuries
suffered by the American colonies, then so must the British people. Yet Americans had
deep ties with the British—not just by consanguinity, as noted by the Declaration, but
also commercial, religious, and ideological. Given Britain’s mastery of the seas, it would
have been difficult to imagine that the colonies, after independence, could flourish
15
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without some sort of accommodation with the British. Indeed, the Declaration’s
references to the British people are notably gentle:
Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned
them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable
jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our
emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and
magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to
disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and
correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of
consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces
our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War,
in Peace Friends.18
The effort to separate out the king for special obloquy, and to distinguish him from the
British people and their parliament, exploited British historical memory and political
currents in Britain at that time. British hostility to its own monarchy extended back to the
seventeenth century, culminating in the regicide of Charles I. By the eighteenth century,
there was an uneasy compromise between Crown and the people, but George III was not
a popular figure. He was the target of a powerful political movement that accused him
and the parliamentary leadership of corruption. “Country” critics of the king and
Parliament argued that the Crown used offices and revenues at its disposal to bribe
members of Parliament who would therefore no longer serve as a counterweight to
executive power.19 Many Americans shared these views.20 Although Americans greatly
respected, even idealized, the king earlier in the eighteenth century, while having only a
vague notion of what Parliament was, by the revolutionary period he had attracted intense
hostility on the ground that he had violated the social contract.21 The exaggerated beliefs
about the King’s power, and the correspondingly vague sense of Parliamentary power,
may explain why the King was blamed for British colonial policy. It was thus an obvious
strategy to blame the king for the injuries that made the American revolution necessary,
and absolve the British people as much as possible, in this way exploiting divisions in the
British political class and laying the foundations for a return to friendly relations in the
future.
The words were not just rhetoric. American political institutions during and after
the revolution were notable for the weakness of the executive office. State legislatures
inherited the executive powers of royal governors; state governorships were mostly weak,
ministerial offices.22 The Articles of Confederation failed to establish an executive office
18
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for the national government. Suspicion of the executive ran deep. Yet as state legislatures
used their new-found powers to cancel debts, redistribute wealth, and persecute
dissenters, it soon became clear that “legislative tyranny,” a term that came into use at
that time, was just as dangerous as executive tyranny.23 Meanwhile, at the national level,
the absence of a powerful executive hampered the war effort, limited the ability of the
national government to respond to internal rebellions, and put the American people at a
disadvantage in commercial disputes with foreign nations.
Hence one of the chief motivations for holding a constitutional convention was to
strengthen the national executive.24 The Federalists were pragmatists who were willing to
abandon their earlier opposition to a strong executive because intervening experience had
taught them that a weak executive spelled ruin.25 But they ran into a strong tide of
opposition. Indeed, the Antifederalists could simply cite the Revolution-era criticisms of
George III. Again, the names of Caesar, Cromwell, and other historical tyrants were
invoked.26 Republics are often weak and internally divided, hence vulnerable to a
charismatic leader who can promise unity and who controls the military. Once powerful
figures obtained the office of the executive, institutional barriers against abuse would fall
away. Antifederalists adopted the Country party’s rhetorical “logic of escalation,” “by
which it tended to see in every limited act of government a larger plan aiming to subvert
popular liberty.”27 For the Country critics, Britain was constantly in danger of sliding
back into the royal absolutism from which the Glorious Revolution had only temporarily
and imperfectly saved the nation. For the Antifederalists, a powerful executive office in
the United States would pose similar dangers. They imitated the tyrannophobic rhetoric
of the Country party even after the United States was no longer threatened by Britain’s
monarchical institutions and even though circumstances in the United States differed
from those in Britain. Thus did tyrannophobic tropes enter American political discourse
at an early stage, transplanted from a country that had experienced real tyrants in its
recent past, but taking root in the soil of a country for which royal absolutism had no
party. The rhetoric persisted after its foundation had vanished.
The debate about executive abuse was not resolved in the Constitution. The
founders created a presidency and vested it with undefined executive powers. A handful
of more specific powers that would turn out to be consequential did not have a clear
meaning at the time of negotiations. The veto power might be understood just to mean the
right to veto unconstitutional legislation, not legislation that the president rejected on
policy grounds. The commander-in-chief power could refer only to tactical control, not
military strategy and foreign policy in general. The power to receive ambassadors could
23
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refer to a ceremonial role, not (as it was later interpreted) the power to recognize states
and governments. It was possible to conceive of the presidency as a ministerial position,
similar to that of any number of weak governorships that existed in the American states,
or as a much more important figure.28 Ambiguous language papered over these disputes
and the debate continued into the Washington administration.
B. Post-Founding American History
The trend of presidential power over two centuries resembles a graph of GDP or
the stock market—a gradual trend upwards but with cyclical peaks and valleys along the
way. The canonical list of powerful presidents includes Washington, Jackson, Polk,
Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Nixon.29 Each
powerful president was followed by one or more weak presidents, at least if we include
among the weak Truman, who cemented American dominance of world institutions and
ran an essentially unilateral war in Korea, but who also became highly unpopular and
(thus) lost a major showdown with the Supreme Court.30 Each powerful president was
accused, at one time or another, of Caesarism (as were many weak presidents).
Discomfort with the concentration of power in the hands of one man may well have led to
a political backlash in each case, hampering the ability of the successors to exercise
power. Many of these presidencies were also followed by formal constitutional and
legislative changes designed to limit the power of future presidents.31 In other cases, the
weakness of succeeding presidents may have owed more to the hostile political climate
toward executive power that the powerful president left in his wake.
FDR’s administration was the watershed.32 Many of the presidencies that
followed it were powerful — Truman’s for a time, Eisenhower’s, Johnson’s, Nixon’s,
Reagan’s. Of these, only Nixon’s abuses created a backlash, leading to the weak
presidencies of Ford and Carter and to a series of framework statutes intended to check
executive power. Historians usually invoke the cold war and the rise of the administrative
state as the explanatory factors giving rise to the imperial presidency. The United States
was, for the first time in its history, continuously engaged in a life-or-death struggle with
28
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a foreign power, over decades rather than years. A powerful executive was always
thought necessary for planning and conducting military operations; accordingly, the
powerful executive was institutionalized.33 Meanwhile, the United States had developed a
true national market that required regulation at a national level. The technological
problems in the modern era seemed to require continuous monitoring and adjustment,
tasks that only an executive bureaucracy can handle.34
But if American presidents have gained more legal and political power over time,
they remain vastly more constrained, at least politically, than the Caesars and the
Cromwells that the founders feared. Indeed, the United States—unlike many other
countries, including Germany, of course—has never had a dictator, nor has it come close.
Every president has humbly submitted to an election after four years and stepped down
(except for FDR) after eight. George Washington, in many respects a model of the
constrained executive, devoted much of his Farewell Address to warning his fellow
citizens about the risks and evils of tyranny.35 Lincoln violated the law at the start of the
Civil War but felt that he needed to obtain congressional ratification of his actions after
the fact, and stood for election at the end of his first term. Wilson and Roosevelt also had
tremendous power to conduct war, but presidential power has always contracted with the
return to peace—or, put differently, while presidents are understood to have broad warmaking powers, these powers have not resulted in peacetime dictatorships.
The peculiar danger reflected by Caesar and Cromwell, and later Napoleon, was
that a charismatic military leader would become a dictator by popular acclimation. This
never happened in the United States. The closest example is Andrew Jackson, and while
he used his powers aggressively—notably, by ignoring a supreme court ruling and by
refusing to comply with a statute that required the Treasury to deposit funds with the
Bank of the United States—no historian considers him a dictator. Although Jackson’s
impact on the presidency was large in the long term—he was the first charismatic,
populist president, and helped establish the modern party system—like so many other
strong presidents, he provoked a backlash36 and was followed by a string of mediocrities.
A few historians think that Douglas MacArthur could have staged a coup d’état after
being fired by Truman. This judgment is questionable, to say the least; MacArthur
quickly became a figure of ridicule.37 Eisenhower, while arguably a strong president,
used his powers moderately. Americans admire the military but the culture is not
militaristic; aside from Washington, Eisenhower, and Jackson, no great military leader
has had any success as a politician.38
33
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The worst decade for democracy was the 1930s, when global economic upheaval
produced dictatorships around the world. Conditions were worse in the United States than
in many of these countries. For a very brief period, some Americans admired Mussolini,
who seemed to be able to get things done. In 1927, Studebaker even named one of its cars
the “Dictator.”39 But the rise of dictatorship in Europe and elsewhere, especially when it
took an ugly turn in the 1930s, did not lead to imitation in the United States. The only
serious American politician who could even remotely seem to fit the fascist mold was
Huey Long, the governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932, and senator from 1932 to
1935. As governor and leader of a political party, Long advanced a populist platform of
redistribution and public works. He was a charismatic leader who some believe sought to
create a cult of personality and to obtain dictatorial powers.40 Whether or not he had this
goal, he never came close to achieving it. He obtained power in Louisiana through
democratic means; maintained power by cooperating with the political establishment; and
was assassinated before he had any serious prospect of running for president and
obtaining national power.
C. Hypotheses
This quick historical sketch suggests several hypotheses about the role of
tyrannophobia in American history. The first is that the inheritance of tyrannophobia, as
reflected in the Declaration of Independence and founding debates, has served Americans
well by providing a bulwark against abuse of executive power—either by motivating de
jure constraints on the executive or popular skepticism toward demagogues who sought
executive office. Such people could not gain traction at a national level or for any amount
of time because they awoke historical memories of Caesar and Cromwell. Popular
presidents like FDR faced similar tyrannophobic resistance.41 Tyrannophobia damaged
FDR’s standing when he tried to pack the Supreme Court, and tyrannophobia would lead
to the enactment of institutional constraints on the executive after FDR’s administration
ended, such as the 22nd amendment, which limited the president to two terms, and the
Administrative Procedure Act, which imposed procedural constraints on executive
administration.42 On this view, a central feature of American political psychology—fear
of executive power—serves as a constraint on the executive every bit as important as the
separation of powers and other institutional constraints.
The second hypothesis is that American tyrannophobia has been a fundamentally
irrational phenomenon that has interfered with needed institutional development. Caesar
took control of a highly militarized and hierarchical society. The seventeenth-century
England of Cromwell and the Stuarts was also profoundly different from that of the
39
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United States—agrarian, poorly educated, riven by violent religious conflicts,
aristocratic, and centered around a hereditary monarchy. What relevance could these
examples have for the United States—relatively educated, egalitarian, and religiously
peaceful from the founding, and then industrialized, highly educated, and secular over
time? We might think of tyrannophobia as similar to other prejudices that perhaps had
some social function under radically different circumstances in the distant past, but that
have no place in modern times, and only retard institutional change that is needed to
address modern challenges.43 Indeed, if the aim is to minimize the risk of dictatorship, or
just to take optimal precautions against it, tyrannophobia might be counterproductive, for
reasons we will discuss.
The first two hypotheses treat tyrannophobia as a causal factor; another possibility
is that it is epiphenomenal. Americans fear the executive, but this fear does not make the
risk of dictatorship greater or less. Tyrannophobia is an effect, not a cause, and hence of
little interest from a legal or policy perspective. We take up these hypotheses in the
sections that follow, from a comparative perspective (Section III) and as applied to the
United States (Section IV).
III. Comparative Tyrannophobia
One way to evaluate the hypotheses mentioned above is by doing cross-country
comparisons. In this part, we attempt to test the hypothesis that tyrannophobia helps to
prevent dictatorship. We find no evidence for that effect. Across polities, tyrannophobia
is no safeguard of democracy. The literature attributes dictatorship to general
demographic variables; our own look at the evidence leaves this conclusion undisturbed.
A. Does Tyrannophobia Prevent Dictatorship?
The hypothesis is that public fear of dictatorship—tyrannophobia—explains why
some states never become dictatorships while others do. To test this hypothesis, one
needs a measure of tyrannophobia. How does one do that? In our discussion of American
history, we appealed to documentary sources. We do not have the expertise to conduct a
similar analysis for other countries; nor is it obvious how one could convert documentary
evidence into a quantifiable variable.
Indeed, tyrannophobia might be a culturally specific phenomenon, unique to the
United States. It is difficult to think of another country where fear of the executive is such
an important part of political discourse (although, as we will see, American
tyrannophobia appears to be an elite phenomenon, not shared by the general population).
Many countries are, of course, authoritarian, and people in authoritarian countries rarely
criticize the government openly. Consider China and Russia. Among democracies, some
43

Alpers, for example, argues that what we call tyrannophobia—an excessive fear of tyranny—led to
persecution of dissenters and others who opposed American foreign policy during World War II and the
cold war, which was presented by the government as a conflict with dictatorship. Alpers, supra note, at
301-02.
12

have an authoritarian streak, such as France with its Gaullist tradition. In Germany, the
touchstone for political discourse is not dictatorship but nationalism. Britain, not
threatened by dictatorship since the seventeenth century, is comfortable with its
ceremonial monarchy, powerful parliament and (hence) exceptionally powerful prime
minister. One might think that tyrannophobia would flourish in countries that have
recently moved from dictatorship to democracy, such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and
Indonesia, but one must recall that in many of those countries, partisans of the defunct
authoritarian regime remain and wield substantial influence. By contrast, the United
States kicked out its Tories after the revolution.
We have searched for quantitative proxies for tyrannophobia and the best we have
found are results from the World Values Survey.44 We focus on two questions. The first
question asks whether having a “strong leader” is very good, fairly good, bad, or very
bad.45 The second question asks whether “democracies are indecisive and have too much
squabbling” and gave respondents the choice of answering: agree strongly, agree,
disagree, and strongly disagree.46 We assume that tyrannophobes are more likely to
answer the first question with “very bad” and the second question with “strongly
disagree.”
We put together a dataset that includes the survey results (in both cases, the
variable equals the sum of the percentages of the two positive responses), along with the
Polity IV democracy score for 2000 (from 0 to 10, reflecting increasing democratization),
per capita GDP for 2000, and information regarding whether the country was governed
by a dictatorship at any time after 1950. We also include the Index of Executive
Dominance (higher for countries with stronger executives).47 Table 1 provides the
information for 22 countries.
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Table 1: Survey Results for Selected Nations48
“Strong
Leader”
24%
33%
64%
22%
36%
31%
16%
33%
17%
64%
24%

“Democracies
Indecisive”
-61%
-50%
35%
-29%
74%
35%
66%
25%

Polity IV
Democracy
(2000)
10
10
8
10
0
7
0
9
10
9
7

Per Capita
GDP
(2000)
$23,200
$25,300
$6,500
$24,800
$3,600
$6,200
$3,600
$24,400
$23,400
$2,200
$2,900

Index of
Executive
Dominance
5.06
1.98
-4.90
-3.00
-5.52
2.82
2.08
--

Iran

74%

28%

4

$6,300

--

Japan
Mexico
Nicaragua
Russia
South
Africa
Spain
Sweden
United
Kingdom
United
States
Vietnam

24%
58%
19%
57%

43%
62%
-72%

10
8
8
7

$24,900
$9,100
$2,700
$7,700

2.57
-4.17
--

--1964-1984
-1950-2007
1950-1956
1952-2007
---1957-1998
1950-1996
2004-2007
-1950-1987
1950-1983
1950-1991

44%

52%

9

$8,500

--

--

33%
18%

36%
48%

10
10

$18,000
$22,200

4.36
3.42

1950-1975
--

28%

45%

10

$22,800

5.52

--

33%

39%

10

$36,200

1.00

--

9%

--

0

$1,950

--

1954-2007

Country
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Columbia
Egypt
France
Germany
India
Indonesia

Period of
Dictatorship
(1950-2007)

48

World Values Survey, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (last visited July 15, 2009); Polity IV Annual
Time-Series 1800-2007: Excel time-series data, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2007.xls (last
visited
July
30,
2009);
Central
Intelligence
Agency
World
Factbook,
http://cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2001/factbook_2001.zip (last visited July 30, 2009)
(All values in 2000 dollars.); LIJPHART, supra note, AT 132-33 (1999). Data were obtained through the
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indecisive and have too much squabbling (E121)." Where there were data from both waves, only the most
recent survey results were used. When the survey results had two options for positive responses, the
response rates were aggregated. The Polity IV Democracy score “is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10).
The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political
participation (variable 2.6), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (variables 2.3 and
2.2), and constraints on the chief executive (variable 2.4).” Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV
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http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf (last viewed July 30, 2007). The index of
executive dominance is based on the duration of executive cabinets. For the details, see LIJPHART at 13234. The period of dictatorship was determined by looking at both the Democracy score and the actual Polity
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15.
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Our dataset is cross-sectional, so we cannot directly test whether a democracy
with a tyrannophobic population is less likely to become a dictatorship. Instead, we
simply looked for correlations. We do not find statistically significant correlations that
support the psycho-cultural hypothesis.49 A tyrannophobic public (as measured by
answers to the survey questions) is just as likely to live in a non-democracy as in a
democracy.
It turns out that tyrannophobia is positively correlated with wealth: people in rich
countries distrust strong leaders more. But there is a more complex pattern. In richer
countries, approval of strong leaders is negatively correlated with democratization; in
poorer countries, approval of strong leaders is positively correlated with democratization.
To investigate these relationships more rigorously, we ran a cross-sectional logit
regression with a democracy dummy (Polity IV score greater than six) as the dependent
variable, Strong Leader as the independent variable of interest, and 2000 per capita GDP
as the control. The data set consists of 84 countries. Although the signs are consistent
with the correlations, the results fall just short of statistical significance; adding dummies
for continent further diminished statistical significance.50 Similarly, when we run separate
regressions for rich and poor countries, the signs are consistent with those of the
correlations but the results fall short of statistical significance.
What might account for these (weak) correlations? In rich countries, the median
voter gets the institutional arrangement that she prefers. If that person supports
democratic institutions, democratic institutions are sustained. This suggests that de facto
political power of the average person when she is wealthy and educated translates into de
jure democratic institutions. Causation could also go the other direction: perhaps people
give their support to whatever institutions they have, as long as they are relatively
wealthy and educated and thus presumptively happy. In poor countries, perhaps
increasing democratization is often accompanied by greater social and political disorder,
leading the average person to yearn for the strong hand of the dictator. When a dictator
actually exists, however, that average person thinks differently. With less wealth and
education, people cannot easily monitor the political situation, blame the existing
institutions for their poverty, and support change.
How does the U.S. compare? In 84 countries, a mean of 35 percent of people say
that a strong leader is very or fairly good. The United States, with 33 percent, is just a
hair below the mean, and ranks 47th most-tyrannophobic out of 84. Looking at
democracies only (Polity IV score above 6), there are 51 observations, a mean of 31
percent, and the United States is now 41st most-tyrannophobic out of 51. Looking at the
49
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top democracies only (Polity IV score equals 10), there are 26 observations, a mean of 25
percent, and the United States is now 20th most-tyrannophobic out of 26.
So the general population of the United States is somewhat less tyrannophobic
than in other democracies: Americans as a whole tend to support strong leaders. At the
same time, the United States has a relatively weak executive, according to the Index of
Executive Dominance. What, then, accounts for tyrannophobic rhetoric in American
political discourse? Perhaps, the historical legacy of the revolutionary war; or perhaps
American tyrannophobia is an elite phenomenon not captured in the World Values
Survey, reflecting the ancient fear that a dictator will redistribute from rich to poor.51
B. Alternative Explanations for the Absence of Dictatorship
If tyrannophobia does not prevent dictatorship, what does?
1. Demographics
Probably the most robust result of cross-country empirical work on dictatorship is
that the best safeguard for democracy is wealth. No democracy has fallen in a nation
whose average per capita income was greater than a little over $6,000 in 1995 dollars.52
(In Weimar Germany in 1933, average per capita income was $3,556, down from $4,090
in 1928).53 Stated in 2008 dollars, average per capita income in the United States is no
less than $39,751.54 If this pattern reflects causal forces, the United States is unlikely to
become a dictatorship in the foreseeable future, simply because of its enormous wealth.
What causes the association between wealth and the stability of democracy? The
causes are uncertain, even if the pattern itself is robust. One account is that “the intensity
of distributional conflicts is lower at higher income levels.”55 On this model, as income
rises, the marginal utility of further increases in income declines, so the relatively poor
will have less to gain (in utility terms) from subverting the democratic order in order to
redistribute wealth to themselves, while the relatively rich will have less to lose from
majoritarian redistribution under democracy. The poor will accept less redistribution, the
rich will accept more, the set of policies that are politically acceptable to both sides
expands, and no social group thinks it is worthwhile to gamble on a bid for dictatorship.
A different but compatible model focuses on inequality between elites and
masses.56 Democracy, in the sense of the electoral franchise, arises when masses can
51
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credibly threaten to revolt and to expropriate the wealth of rich elites. The elites want to
buy off the masses with a measure of redistribution, but a promise to make direct
transfers is not credible; the masses realize that once the revolutionary crowd has
dispersed, elites will have no incentive to redistribute. Understanding this, elites offer the
masses voting power so as to credibly commit to share the wealth.57 In a majoritarian
democracy with a skewed distribution of wealth, the median voter will vote for transfers
from rich to poor. The model implies that democracy will come into existence only when
inequality is neither too high nor too low; if inequality is very high, the elites will have
too much to lose from redistribution and will choose to fight it out, while if inequality is
very low, the masses will have too little incentive to organize for revolution in the first
place.
So both wealth in the absolute sense and the distribution of wealth are relevant, to
both the emergence of democracy and its stability over time. Empirically, factors besides
wealth and moderate redistribution can also help to create or sustain democracy, although
these factors appear less important.58 A higher average level of education lowers the costs
to citizens of mobilizing en masse to create a credible threat against elites, lowers the
costs of obtaining and processing information about government action, and socializes
citizens in the putative virtues of the democratic order in which they live. Ethnic and
linguistic homogeneity are positively correlated with the stability of democracy,59
perhaps because homogeneity lowers the costs of mass organization. Finally, where there
is heterogeneity, the existence of “overlapping cleavages” – cross-cutting social
structures rather than unified and hostile subgroups – helps democracy as well.60
2. Institutional Design
The institutional design hypothesis is that constitutional structure and rights
prevent dictatorship. A central controversy in the literature involves a possible connection
between presidentialism and the failure of democracy. A number of scholars have argued
that presidential systems are more brittle than parliamentary ones, in the sense that
57
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presidential systems are more likely to collapse into authoritarian rule.61 A key
mechanism behind this result is that presidential systems “are highly vulnerable to
legislative-executive deadlocks.”62 In times of economic or political crisis especially,
such deadlocks create public demand for the strong hand of a dictator, and an elected
president can more easily stage an autogolpe than can any other official.
On this view, presidentialism is especially risky in the presence of a fragmented
party system.63 Where parties multiply, gridlock follows, and an independently elected
executive can appear to stand above party, offering decisive action while facing little in
the way of organized countervailing power. The framers failed to anticipate the
development of the modern political party,64 and in America’s early history parties were
fluid, fragmentary and ill-defined, so this path to dictatorship was a live possibility—at
least if the theory is correct. However, an alternative view is that the empirical pattern is
an artifact of selection effects: presidential systems collapse into dictatorships because
presidential systems are selected in unstable countries.65 At present, there is no scholarly
consensus on the issue.
Where does this leave us? The demographic hypothesis looks stronger than ever
in light of the weak or ambiguous results for the competitors. To be sure, our data
analysis has been extremely tentative and crude. We think there is enough here, however,
to justify skepticism toward the psychological hypothesis that tyrannophobia preserves
democracy against the threat of dictatorship.
IV. Dictatorship and Tyrannophobia in America
Against this historical and comparative background, we turn to the relationship
between tyrannophobia and dictatorship in the United States. If tyrannophobia were a
crucial safeguard against dictatorship, it would have benefits (although, as we discussed
in Part I, the benefits would not be as large as some assume). However, we believe that
tyrannophobia is either not a safeguard against dictatorship, or is at best an unnecessary
and costly one, akin to placing one’s house underground to guard against the trivial risk
of a meteor strike. In the administrative state that flowered in the 20th century,
demographic factors provide an independent and sufficient buffer against dictatorship.
The United States of 2009 is too wealthy, with a population that is too highly educated, to
slide into authoritarianism. Very likely, it really can’t happen here;66 current
tyrannophobia can only be of the irrational variety, and if it constrains institutions or
61

Przeworski et al., supra note, at 44-47.
Id. at 47; see Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in
THE FAILURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3, 6-8 (Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994).
63
Wintrobe, supra note, at 259-62; Scott Mainwaring, Presidentialism in Latin America, 25 LATIN
AMERICAN RESEARCH REVIEW 157 (1990)
64
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 27-35 (2005).
65
José Antonio Cheibub, PRESIDENTIALISM, PARLIAMENTARISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2007).
66
Compare SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN’T HAPPEN HERE (1935).
62

18

policies that are otherwise desirable, tyrannophobia produces social costs for little in the
way of offsetting benefits.
A. Causes of Tyrannophobia
As we saw in Part II, tyrannophobic rhetoric, possibly rational, played an
important role in the American founding. The puzzle is that, even if it was justified in that
period as a prophylactic against dictatorship (and it may well not have been), why has it
persisted across two hundred years of political stability?
1. Bounded Rationality
Psychologists have offered a number of hypotheses for why people have incorrect
beliefs about the risk of an event. These hypotheses center around bounded rationality,
particularly cognitive biases and reliance on mental shortcuts called heuristics.67 People
exaggerate risks of events that inspire them with dread (cancer deaths rather than
ordinary illnesses); over which they have no control (nuclear accidents rather than car
accidents); and that have unusual salience. The first tendency is related to loss aversion,
the attribution of greater weight to losses than to identical gains against an arbitrary
reference point. People are also imperfect Bayesians: they update probability estimates in
light of new information as they should, but they do not do this very well or very quickly.
Instead they give too much weight to their initial estimates and discount new information
that conflicts with it. Past probability estimates are stickier, over time, than would be the
case with unbounded rationality.
Let us compare a relatively unconstrained executive and an executive who takes
orders from a legislature. There is a straightforward tradeoff: the first executive can adopt
policies very easily; the second must obtain the consent of a majority of the legislature.
Accordingly, the first executive can more easily act to advance and undermine the public
good; the second executive will have to choose from a narrower range of policy
outcomes, with a limited upside and downside for the public.
We can immediately see that the executive’s ability to inflict worse as well as
better outcomes will engage the public’s loss aversion. People will irrationally
overweight the bad outcome, and hence they will exaggerate the downside of the strong
executive relative to the upside. The limited executive, with its limited downside, will
therefore be more appealing. More speculatively, it is possible that people feel that they
have less control over the executive—a remote figure with a national constituency—than
over the legislature, by virtue of their representation by an individual with whom they are
more likely to have contact (or to know someone who knows him or her, etc.). Further,
the president is a salient figure, the personification of government and the focus of the
national media. It follows that the risks and consequences of executive power are also
more salient than the risks of legislative and judicial power. Finally, and even more
speculatively, imperfect Bayesian updating implies that possibly justified fears of
67
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executive overreaching that existed in earlier periods, including the founding, could
outlast changes in circumstances.68 Bayesian updating is an attribute of individual
decisionmaking of course, but perhaps such a phenomenon could take place at a
collective level. Successive generations inherit attitudes toward the executive held by
previous generations; attitudes that might be justified at an earlier time are not adjusted
by later generations in light of changed circumstances, such as the improved education of
the citizenry.
One might even suggest that in a country such as the United States with strong
traditions of equality and individualism, the president will frequently be the target of
strong feelings of resentment and envy. The pomp of the office sits uneasily with
republican sensibilities. The suspicion that any president will secretly attempt to obtain
dictatorial powers might help resolve cognitive dissonance between these feelings and the
evident inability of presidents to do much more than respond to crises and implement a
tiny portion of their political agenda.69 Tyrannophobia is an element of the broader
paranoid style in American politics, which attributes vast, wrenching social changes to
the machinations of individuals or small groups thought to have extraordinary power.70
Overall, then, the suggestion is that ongoing tyrannophobia in the United States
can be explained by cognitive biases and other psychological phenomena. Just as a single
nuclear accident can cause people to overestimate the risks of nuclear energy and hence
demand that government shut down that industry, with the result that no further accident
can ever occur, the pre-founding brush with executive tyranny—followed by the
dictatorships of such figures as Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao—has caused
Americans to overestimate the risk of executive power and hence recoil against even
reasonable moves toward greater executive authority. Even though dictatorship has never
existed in the United States, Americans fear dictators and refuse to support anyone who
seems to have dictatorial ambitions, and are reluctant to support legislative and
constitutional changes that could increase executive power; this reluctance persists even
though circumstances have changed, and the actual risks of dictatorship are far lower than
in the past.
2. Rational Updating
There is a second and related possibility, which resonates with American political
culture; we will state it only briefly. On this account, the relaxation, over time, of de jure
68
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checks on the presidency has fed tyrannophobia, because the growth of de facto checks
on the presidency is ignored. Tocqueville observed that Americans are legalistic,71 and it
is still a striking fact of American political discourse that even elites tend to equate the
absence of legal checks on the executive with the absence of any checks on the executive.
Political checks on the executive are more amorphous and vague than legal checks; they
do not often produce the sort of highly salient constitutional showdowns that occur when
presidential power is tested and constrained by a decision of the Supreme Court. The
epistemic costs of acquiring and processing information about political checks are higher
than for legal checks, so even rational citizens might underestimate the extent and
strength of the former relative to the latter. The consequence is that as legal checks erode,
the populace will increase its estimate of the risks of dictatorship, while the actual risk
may remain constant or even decline, depending on the actual strength of the political
checks.
On this account, tyrannophobia need not rest upon bounded rationality in the
sense of psychological quirks. It is merely an overestimate of the risks of dictatorship
arising from positive information costs – more precisely, differences in the cost of
acquiring information about different types of constraint on the executive. An implication
is that if the costs of political information fall, due to the Internet and other technological
advances, the public will know more about political checks on the executive, and
tyrannophobia will abate.72
B. The Effects of Tyrannophobia
1. Tyrannophobia and the Risk of Dictatorship
Tyrannophobia might itself affect the risk of dictatorship. This effect, if it exists,
might run in either of two directions: widespread tyrannophobia among the public or
elites might either reduce the risk of dictatorship or actually increase it. A third
possibility, suggested by the survey results discussed in Part III, is that tyrannophobia has
no independent causal force at all. We will consider these possibilities in turn.
On the first possibility, tyrannophobia is a fear that provides its own remedy.
Perhaps the United States has never come close to dictatorship in part because
tyrannophobia is widespread, causing political actors to take stringent precautions against
executive abuses, including hyperbolic assertions that any increase in executive power is
the harbinger of dictatorship. In the most optimistic version of this account, the framers
premised central institutions of American constitutional law on the fear of dictatorship
and geared them to minimize the risk, but this is desirable because the risk is high; eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty. If the risk has never materialized, that is because our
vigilance has never lapsed. Moreover, the longer the period with no dictatorship – a risk
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that has occasionally materialized in other nations, even seemingly liberal and democratic
ones – the more the framers’ fears of dictatorship seem justified, in a cycle of selfconfirming expectations.
Unfortunately, that optimistic possibility is observationally equivalent to two
other possibilities: (1) dictatorship is not observed in the United States because it was
never a real risk in the first place, even without the institutions erected to guard against it;
(2) the precautionary institutions actually had the perverse effect of increasing the risk of
dictatorship, but by fortuity that risk never materialized. In either case, the elaborate
safeguards against dictatorship built into the constitutional structure are costs that create
no expected benefit or that even create expected harm. A firm that hires expensive
security guards and then experiences no robberies should realize that several different
inferences are possible: the guards’ presence prevents the robberies (the optimistic
scenario); or the risk was lower than initially feared and the guards are an unnecessary
expense; or the guards’ presence actually exacerbates the risk of robberies, by signaling
that the firm has valuables it needs to protect. The available information does not
discriminate among these possibilities. A symptom of unjustified tyrannophobia is the
assumption that the optimistic story simply must be correct.
In the worst possible case, tyrannophobia might actually increase the risk of
dictatorship and thus prove self-defeating. Two mechanisms might bring this about. In
the first, tyrannophobic constitutional designers set up elaborate vetogates, legislative and
judicial oversight, and other checks and balances, all with an eye to minimizing the risks
of executive dictatorship. However, these checks and balances create gridlock and make
it difficult to pass necessary reforms. Where the status quo becomes increasingly
unacceptable to many, as in times of economic or political crisis, the public demands or
at least accepts a dictator who can sweep away the institutional obstacles to reform.73
Here the very elaborateness of the designers’ precautions against dictatorship creates
pent-up public demand that itself leads to dictatorship. Comparative politics provides
(contested) evidence for this story,74 and if Lincoln or Roosevelt had become a genuine
dictator, a similar account would be natural. On this view, the United States was lucky
not to have experienced dictatorship during earlier periods of its history; we return to this
point shortly
In another mechanism, tyrannophobic constitutional designers create oversight
bodies to check the executive, yet these oversight bodies themselves become tyrannical.
In this way, tyranny sneaks up behind the back of the tyrannophobe, who is gazing
vigilantly in the wrong direction. In Honduras in 2009, a democratically elected president
proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish presidential term limits. Citing the risk of
executive dictatorship, legislators and soldiers dragged him from his bed and hustled him
73
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into exile – a classically dictatorial move. There are no such lurid cases in the United
States, but mechanisms of legislative oversight have sometimes produced a kind of
legislative tyranny writ small, as in the case of Joe McCarthy, many of whose abuses
were effected through committee oversight of executive branch personnel and
decisionmaking. The fear of “Government by Judiciary”75 is best understood as a fear
that judicial checks, intended to prevent legislative or executive tyranny, will themselves
produce either judicial tyranny or, more plausibly, judicial gerontocracy.
Both these mechanisms suggest that precautions against tyranny can create the
risks they aim to avert. Institutional design must then trade off two competing risks of
tyranny, which can arise either because there are no institutional checks in place, or
because of and through the very institutions set up to guard against it. Checks against
tyranny embody a kind of precautionary principle. Here as elsewhere, however,
precautionary principles can be self-defeating if precautions exacerbate the risk itself, so
precautions must be entered on both sides of the cost-benefit ledger.76
So in the abstract, it is plausible that tyrannophobia prevents dictatorship, but also
plausible that it exacerbates the risks. Finally, tyrannophobia might simply have no effect
on the risk of dictatorship at all. The comparative evidence surveyed in Part III clearly
suggests this, although it does not conclusively demonstrate it. Across a large set of
democracies and non-democracies, levels of tyrannophobia, defined as the inverse of
support for a strong executive, are not significantly correlated with the type of political
regime. Tyrannophobic publics are as likely to live in nondemocracies as in democracies.
Tyrannophobia probably does not constitute a safeguard against dictatorship, in the
United States or elsewhere.
2. Alternative Explanations
If tyrannophobia has not protected America from dictatorship, what has? We will
examine two competing hypotheses: that America has avoided tyranny through the
excellence of its constitutional design, and that America has avoided tyranny in virtue of
its demographics. The second hypothesis has much more support.
Institutions: On Presidentialism and Luck. One theory is that America has never
experienced dictatorship because of the foresight of the framers. Fearing Caesarism,
Cromwellism, and monarchical prerogative, the framers on this account set up an
elaborate system of separated powers accompanied by checks and balances. The premise
of the system was that the union of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the same
hands “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”77 The framers also
limited the executive’s emergency powers, in part by providing safeguards against

75

RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
76
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 27-32 (2005).
77
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
23

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, whose central function is to ensure judicial
review of executive detention.78
Perhaps these institutional devices have succeeded in some broad sense, even
considering the rise of the so-called imperial presidency in the 20th century. Roosevelt
failed to pack the Court, in part because of widespread fear of executive dictatorship;79
the Administrative Procedure Act, forced through despite a reluctant executive, creates
procedural and judicial checks on executive power; Nixon was forced from office by the
threat of impeachment; and Congress set up the framework statutes of the 1970s, such as
the War Powers Resolution80 and the National Emergencies Act81, in order to constrain
future abuses. In each of the cases, the basic separation of powers—implying a powerful
and independent legislature—hampered executive aggrandizement because the legislature
resisted it. Although the separation of powers in the legal sense has undoubtedly been
weakened in the 20th century, in part by the death of the nondelegation doctrine and the
grant of massive rulemaking powers to the executive, its functions have been taken up, in
part, by competition between political parties.82
Viewed in terms of comparative constitutional design, however, the framers’
choices seem in hindsight to have been poor ones, at least from the standpoint of
minimizing the risk of dictatorship. The central decision to create an independentlyelected executive – although rationalized in the Federalist Papers as a tyranny-prevention
measure – was in fact adopted faute de mieux, after a protracted stalemate at the
convention, which came very close to adopting a parliamentary model in which the
executive would be selected by the majority party in Congress.83 In comparative
perspective, the choice of a presidential system turns out to have been risky, although to
be fair the framers lacked the information needed to understand this.
As we saw in Part III, some scholars believe that presidential systems are more
likely to collapse into authoritarian rule than parliamentary systems are, at least at low
levels of wealth and especially in the presence of fragmented parties. If these scholars are
correct, the separation of powers in the American sense of a separately-elected executive
is a risk factor for dictatorship, rather than a precaution against it; to the extent that this is
true, and if tyranny-prevention was the framers’ major aim, the framers blundered.84 By a
happy accident of history, however, America inherited the first-past-the-post electoral
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system from Britain, and that system has a well-documented tendency to create, over
time, two dominant parties,85 in turn reducing the risks of presidentialism. Thus the risks
that a fragmented party system may create, under presidentialism, were avoided.86 Here
again the framers acted from ignorance, but their choices were fortuitous. In addition, the
decision to give emergency powers to Congress (in the suspension clause), rather than the
president, probably did not help forestall a dictatorship. Lincoln violated the clause, and
Congress acquiesced..
This is not to say that institutional choice did not matter at all. After all, the
founders could have, but did not, establish a dictatorship. One could plausibly argue that
the federalist structure of the constitution helped deter the formation of a national
dictatorship. Anyone who aspired to absolute power would have to contend with
independent power centers in the states even after subjugating Congress and the federal
judiciary. Federalism also weakens incentives to form a dictatorship in a state: ease of
exit would deprive the dictator of rents. An independent judiciary, as opposed to one
maintained and funded by the executive, also would be a nuisance to an aspiring dictator.
All that said, however, it is at least plausible that the United States has avoided tyranny
largely despite its constitutional design, not because of that design.
Demography and the Administrative State. The best explanation for the lack of
dictatorship in America – at least in America today, as opposed to the 19th century – is
neither psychological nor institutional, but demographic. Part III examined the strong
comparative evidence that wealth is the best safeguard for democracy. Equality,
homogeneity, and education matter as well. How does the United States, circa 2009, fare
on these dimensions? Ethnic, religious and linguistic homogeneity have declined, but
because of its high performance on other margins, there is little cause for concern about
American democracy. The United States has an enormously rich, relatively well-educated
population and multiple overlapping cleavages of class, race, religion and geography.
Simply by virtue of its high per capita income, the likelihood of dictatorship in the United
States is almost nil, at least if the historical pattern reflects causation. The highwater mark
of the modern presidency’s approach to domestic dictatorship – Nixon’s “third-rate
burglary” of the offices of his political opponents – was pathetic stuff in historical and
comparative perspective, and immediately put Nixon on a slippery slope to disgrace.
Likewise, comparisons between Weimar Germany and the United States of the Bush
administration87 were worse than irresponsible; they were ignorant.
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We add a less obvious point. Legal scholars, especially those of a libertarian or
civil-libertarian bent, often express concern that the formal separation of powers has
atrophied over the course of the 20th century. On this account, economic and security
crises, the rise of the administrative state, the death of the nondelegation doctrine, the
imperial presidency, the ineffectual character of the War Powers Resolution and the other
framework statutes of the 1970s, all mean that in many domains presidents operate
without substantial legal checks, although they have political incentives to cooperate with
Congress and to seek statutory authorization for their actions. Among the framer’s
miscalculations was their failure to understand the “presidential power of unilateral
action”88 – the president’s power to take action in the real world, with debatable legal
authority or none at all, creating a new status quo that then constrains the response of
other institutions. In the most overheated version of this view, such developments are
taken to pose a real risk of executive tyranny in the United States.89
We suggest, however, that the same large-scale economic and political
developments that have caused a relaxation of the legal checks on the executive have
simultaneously strengthened the nonlegal checks. Legal checks on the presidency have
been relaxed largely because of the need for centralized, relatively efficient government
under the complex conditions of a modern dynamic economy and a highly interrelated
international order. Yet those economic and political conditions have themselves helped
to create de facto constraints on presidential power that make democracy in the United
States extremely stable.
The modern economy, whose complexity creates the demand for administrative
governance, also creates wealth, leisure, education and broad political information, all of
which strengthen democracy and make a collapse into authoritarian rule nearly
impossible. Modern presidents are substantially constrained, not by old statutes or even
by Congress and the courts, but by the tyranny of public and (especially) elite opinion.
Every action is scrutinized, leaks from executive officials come in a torrent, journalists
are professionally hostile, and potential abuses are quickly brought to light. The modern
presidency is a fishbowl, in large part because the costs of acquiring political information
have fallen steadily in the modern economy, and because a wealthy, educated and
leisured population has the time to monitor presidential action and takes an interest in
doing so. This picture implies that modern presidents are both more accountable than
their predecessors and more responsive to gusts of elite sentiment and mass opinion, but
they are not dictators in any conventional sense.
More tentatively, we also suggest that the relaxation of legal checks may itself
have contributed to the growth of the political checks, rather than both factors simply
being the common result of a complex modern economy. On this hypothesis, the
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administrative and presidential state of the New Deal and later has, despite all its
inefficiencies, plausibly supplied efficiency-enhancing regulation, political stability, and
a measure of redistribution, and these policies have both added to national economic and
cultural capital and dampened political conflict. The administrative state has thus helped
to create a wealthy, educated population and a super-educated elite whose members have
the leisure and affluence to care about matters such as civil liberties, who are politically
engaged to a fault, and who help to check executive abuses. While the direct effects of
wealth, education and other factors on the stability of democracy are clear in comparative
perspective, there is more dispute about the overall economic effects of regulation and the
administrative state,90 so we offer this as a hypothesis for further research.
C. The Costs and Benefits of Tyrannophobia
We have suggested that the framers’ tyrannophobia, combined with the lack of
dictatorship in later periods, plausibly fuels contemporary tyrannophobia, insofar as
contemporary actors infer that the framer’s design choices are what has allowed
democracy to endure. However, the inference is invalid, for the key choice of
presidentialism may itself have been a risk factor for dictatorship; if it was, then the
framers inadvertently put self-government at risk, but were favored by fortune. Likewise,
while it is possible that tyrannophobia has an endogenous tyranny-preventing effect, it is
equally possible that it perversely increases the risk, and the most plausible conclusion of
all is that it has no effect in either direction; to ignore the latter two possibilities is itself a
major symptom of tyrannophobia. Tyrannophobia in the United States is real, and it may
well be the result of the psychological and informational factors discussed above, but
there is no evidence that it contributes to the absence of dictatorship in the United States,
and some affirmative evidence that it does not do so.
Even if tyrannophobia has a weak effect of that sort, it seems clear that wealth and
other demographic factors in all likelihood prevent dictatorship in the United States, quite
apart from its tyrannophobic political culture. Even if tyrannophobia once checked
dictatorship, that check is unnecessary today, in light of the exceptional stability of
advanced democratic polities like the United States. Accordingly, if tyrannophobia
hampers useful grants of power to the executive, it creates social costs—entrenched
reluctance to transfer necessary powers to the executive—for little social benefit.
Elsewhere, we have described a range of institutions and policy initiatives that would
increase welfare by increasing executive power, especially in the domain of
counterterrorism, but that are blocked by “libertarian panics” and tyrannophobia.91
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There is another possibility, which is that even if tyrannophobia is not needed to
prevent dictatorship, it does usefully prevent executive abuse that falls short of
dictatorship. Consider the possibility, for example, that executives are naturally inclined
to use their powers to spy on and otherwise harass political opponents—not to establish
dictatorship, but just to obtain a marginal advantage in the next election.92 This is harmful
behavior that should be deterred. If institutions can deter this behavior only with
difficulty because executive officials all answer to the president, perhaps tyrannophobia
can deter it. The executive, expecting overreaction by the public if word leaks out, does
not engage in the abusive behavior in the first place.
This is certainly possible, and if the choice is between tyrannophobia and a
completely inert and indifferent public, tyrannophobia might seem preferable. Better still,
however, would be a rational and informed public that would express the appropriate
amount of outrage when the executive engages in abuse, and that could distinguish
gradations of abuse rather than treat all such actions as steps on the road to dictatorship.
Modern economies, which feature falling information costs and a leisured elite, tend to
create such publics, although for the reasons we have discussed tyrannophobia persists as
well.
This thought suggests one last case for tyrannophobia. Suppose that rational
members of the public would free ride on each other, with the result that actual public
scrutiny of the presidency falls short of the optimal. Instilling people with tyrannophobia
might give them the emotional impetus to overcome the collective action problem. But
the presidency already has intrinsic interest for the public. “As the parties wasted away,
the Presidency stood out in solitary majesty as the central focus of political emotion, the
ever more potent symbol of national community.”93 On this account, presidents already
receive close public scrutiny; judiciaphobia and legislatophobia would be healthier
political emotions.
Conclusion
Tyrannophobia is a central element of American political culture, and has been
since the founding. We have offered several claims and hypotheses to illuminate its
origins and importance. We suggest that tyrannophobia arises from the interaction
between history and the quirks of political psychology, or from the differential costs of
information about legal and political checks on the executive; that dictatorship, at least in
any strong sense, is not a real possibility in the United States today, due to demographic
factors; and that tyrannophobia therefore has little social utility in modern circumstances.
Whatever its possible utility in the past, a question on which we are agnostic,
tyrannophobia today is just another misperception of risk, akin to a fear of genetically
modified foods. Indeed, in light of the current evidence on the determinants of
democratic stability, tyranny should be at the very bottom of the scale of public concern.
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The modern entrepreneurs of tyrannophobia – from George Orwell to George Lucas –
ought not be lionized as defenders of the liberal state, but instead shunned, as purveyors
of political misinformation.
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